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CHARLES E. BRANT*
Amended Senate Bill 165, to be codified as section 2315.19 of the Ohio
Revised Code, establishes comparative negligence in Ohio.1 The statute,
which became effective on June 20, 1980, also leaves many unanswered
questions. Is the statute to be retroactively applied to those negligence
actions that arose before June 20, 1980 but are tried after that date? How
does the statute affect last clear chance, assumption of risk, willful or
wanton misconduct, the right of common law or contractual indemnity,
negligence per se, derivative or imputed liabilities, joint and several
liability, set-off, or the apportionment" of fault to absent parties? Although
one can not definitively say how the courts will resolve these questions, this
Article will examine some of these questions to alert the Ohio practitioner
to the issues that he or she will face in consequence of the statute.
I. MECHANICS OF THE STATUTE
Although the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act raises innumerable
conceptual questions concerning the continued viability in Ohio of many
of the traditional doctrines of the law of negligence, its basic operation is
relatively straightforward. Whenever the defense of contributory neg-
ligence is raised, the court and, in a jury trial, the jury, now must make
four basic calculations to determine the issues of recovery and damages.
First, the trier of fact must find the total amount of damages sustained
by the complainant and the percentages of negligence, in relation to one
hundred percent, that directly and proximately caused those damages.2
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Northwestern University; partner in the Columbus, Ohio law firm of Glander, Brant, Ledman &
Newman. The author wishes to thank Douglas S. Roberts and J. Stephen Teetor, associates with the
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1. Ohio Comparative Negligence Act, Amended S. 165, 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted
in OHIO LEGis. SERV. LAws OF OHIO 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2315.19]. The Act provides:
(A)(1) In negligence actions, the contributory negligence of a person does not bar the
person or his legal representative from recovering damages that have directly and
proximately resulted from the negligence of one or more other persons, if the contributory
negligence of the person bringing the action was no greater than the combined negligence of
all other persons from whom recovery is sought. However, any damages recoverable by the
person bringing the action shall be diminished by an amount that is proportionately equal to
his percentage of negligence, which percentage is determined pursuant to division (B) of this
Section. This Section does not apply to actions described in Section 4113.03 of the Revised
Code.
(2) If recovery for damages determined to be directly and proximately caused by the
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The finding of percentages should reflect the total fault attributable to the
complainant and to all other persons from whom recovery is sought
Second, based upon these findings, the court must decide whether the
complainant has a right to recover damages. 4 To make this determination,
the court must compare the percentage of negligence attributable to the
complainant with the combined percentage of negligence attributable to
all of the parties from whom the complainant seeks a recovery. Only if the
complainant's negligence is no greater than the total negligence of the
6defendant or defendants will the complainant be allowed to recover.
Otherwise, the court must enter judgment against the complainant.7
Third, if the court finds that the complainant is entitled to recover
(i.e., the court finds that the complainant's negligence is not greater than
the total negligence of the parties from whom recovery is sought), then, to
determine recoverable damages, the court must reduce the complainant's
total damages by an amount that is proportionately equal to his percentage
of negligence.'
Fourth, if there are multiple defendants, the court must allocate the
portion of recoverable damages for which each defendant is liable.9 This
allocation is achieved by multiplying the total recoverable damages by a
negligence of more than one person is allowed under division (A)(1) of this Section, each
person against whom recovery is allowed is liable to the person bringing the action for a
portion of the total damages allowed under that division. The portion of damages for which
each person is liable is calculated by multiplying the total damages allowed by a fraction in
which the numerator is the person's percentage of negligence, which percentage is determined
pursuant to division (B) of this Section, and the denolninator is the total of the percentages of
negligence, which percentages are determined pursuant to division (B) of this Section to be
attributable to all persons from whom recovery is allowed. Any percentage of negligence
attributable to the person bringing the action shall not be included in the total of percentages
of negligence that is the denominator in the fraction.
(B) In any negligence action in which contributory negligence is asserted as a defense,
the court in a nonjury trial shall make findings of fact, and the jury in ajury trial shall return a
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, that shall specify:
(I) The total amount ofdamages that would have been recoverable by the complainant
but for his negligence;
(2) The percentage of negligence that directly and proximately caused the injury, in
relation to one hundred percent, that is attributable to each party to the action.
(C) After the court makes its findings of fact or after thejury returns its general verdict
accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the court shall diminish the total amount of
damages recoverable by an amount that is proportionately equal to the percentage of
negligence of the person bringing the action, which percentage is determined pursuant to
division (B) of this Section. If the percentage of the negligence of the person bringing the
action is greater than the total of the percentages of the negligence of all other persons from
whom recovery is sought, which percentages are determined pursuant to division (B) of this
Section, the court shall enter a judgment for the persons against whom recovery is sought.
2. Amended S. 165, 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHIO LEGIs. SERV. LAwS OF OHIO
5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(B)(1),(2)].
3. Id.
4. Id. [to be codified at OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(C)].
5. Id.
6. Id. [to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(1)].
7. Id. [to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(C)].
8. Id.
9. Id. [to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(B)(2)].
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fraction in which the numerator is the individual defendant's percentage of
negligence and the denominator is one hundred percent minus the
percentage of negligence attributable to the complainant. 10
A few examples may make the above rules easier to comprehend.
The statute works most simply when there is only a single defendant.
In that instance, if the plaintiff is sixty percent negligent while the
defendant is only forty percent negligent, the plaintiff's recovery would be
barred because his negligence is greater than that of the defendant.
Conversely, if both the plaintiff and the defendant are fifty percent
negligent, the plaintiff would recover because his negligence does not
exceed that of the defendant. The plaintiff's recovery, however, is limited
to fifty percent of the total damages sustained by him. Similarly, if a ten
percent negligent plaintiff brings suit against a ninety percent negligent
defendant, the plaintiff recovers ninety percent of his total damages.
Operation of the statute is more complex when the litigation involves
multiple defendants. Suppose that in a negligence action against two
defendants, the trier of fact determines that the plaintiff, who suffered
$20,000 of total damages, is the direct and proximate cause of fifty percent
of the total negligence while defendant(l) and defendant(2) are each
twenty-five percent negligent. Since the plaintiff's negligence (fifty
percent) is not greater than the combined negligence of defendant(l) and
defendant(2) (twenty-five percent and twenty-five percent, or a combined
total of fifty percent), the plaintiff will recover. Recovery, however, is
lessened by an amount equal to the plaintiffs proportionate share of the
total negligence, resulting in $10,000 of recoverable damages,'1 which is to
be allocated among the defendants.
1 2
Recoverable damages are allocated among the defendants according
to the following formula:
[percentage of negligence 
of 13
defendant 's amount of j defendant (x)
liability Lrecoverable] combined negligence of allI[damages [defendants
Applying this formula to the multiple defendant example, defendant(l)'s
liability equals
($10,000) 25% = ($10,000) (.50) = $5,000.
50%
10. Id. [to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2)].
11. As used in this Article, "recoverable damages" are the total damages sustained by the
plaintiff reduced by an amount equal to the proportionate share of damages attributable to the
plaintiff's negligence.
12. In this example, recoverable damages of $10,000 are determined by reducing the $20,000
total damages sustained by the plaintiff by fifty percent, which is the percentage of negligence
attributable to the plaintiff.
13. See Amended S. 165, 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHio LEoIS. SERV. LAws OF
OHIo 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2)].
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Since defendant(2) also is twenty-five percent negligent, his share of
liability for the recoverable damages also will be $5,000.
A more complicated analysis is necessary when additional defendants
become parties to a negligence action. For example, the plaintiff, who
again has sustained $20,000 of total damages, is found by the trier of fact to
be thirty percent negligent while defendant(l) is fifteen percent negligent,
defendant(2) is twenty percent negligent, and defendant(3) is thirty-five
percent negligent. The plaintiff's damages initially must be reduced by an
amount equal to his proportionate share of the total negligence, leaving
$14,000 of recoverable damages attributable to the defendants. 14 Applying
the formula, given above, for allocation of recoverable damages to the
multiple defendants, 5 whose combined negligence equals seventy percent,
each defendant's liability will be calculated in the following fashion:
defendant(l)'s liability = ($14,000) 15%0 $3,00070%
defendant(2)'s liability = ($14,000) 20% = $4,000
70%
defendant(3)'s liability = ($14,000) 35% = $7,000.16
70%
As can be seen from these examples, although the complexity of
application of the statute increases as the number of defendants increases,
application essentially remains a series of mathematical computations.
II. RETROACTIVITY
If a negligence action arises before June 20, 1980 but comes to trial
sometime after that date, will the complainant's contributory negligence
preclude his recovery or merely serve to lessen it? Put another way, does
the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act apply prospectively or retroactive-
ly? 1
7
Although the legislatures of many of the states that have adopted
comparative negligence have eliminated the retroactivity issue by
expressly stating that their comparative negligence statutes are to have
only a prospective effect, 18 an even greater number of state legislatures
14. Twenty thousand dollars total damages minus [($20,000 total damages)(30% plaintiff's
negligence)] results in $14,000 recoverable damages.
15. See text accompaning note 13 supra.
16. According to the formula given earlier, see text accompanying note 13 supra, the $14,000
amount represents the amount of recoverable damages. The numerator in each fraction represents the
individual defendant's percentage of negligence while the denominator in the fraction represents the
combined negligence of all of the defendants.
17. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 8 (1974); H. WooDs, THE NEGLIGENCE
CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 16 (1978); Annotation, Retrospective Application of State Statute
Substituting Rule of Comparative Negligencefor that of Contributory Negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d 1438
(1971); Note, Comparative Negligence: Some New Problems for the Maine Courts, 18 U. MAINE L.
REv. 65, 71-73 (1966); Comment, Judicial Adoption of Comparative Negligence in Ohio, 44 U. CIN. L.
REv. 811, 816-17 (1975).
18. See COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-14(4) (1963); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); KAN.
[Vol. 41:585
1980] COMPARA TIVE NEGLIGENCE
have refused to address the issue;' 9 Ohio unfortunately belongs to the latter
group.
Virtually all the courts that have been forced to resolve the
retroactivity of a statute that is silent on the issue have analyzed the
question in terms of whether the legislature intended the statute to be
prospective or retrospective. 20 The majority of jurisdictions, illustrated by
a line of Wisconsin Supreme Court cases beginning with Brewster v.
Ludtke2 ' and culminating with Holzem v. Mueller2 2 and Lupie v.
Hartzheim,23 have relied upon the well-settled principles that a statute is to
apply only prospectively unless there is a clear legislative intent to the
contrary 4 and that absent a legislative statement, a presumption of
25prospectivity arises, and have held that their comparative negligence
statutes have no retroactive effect.2 6 These holdings have been justified on
the ground that "while a court's pronouncements may apply to past
conduct, a legislature's function is to declare law for the future. 2a
Despite the weight of authority favoring the majority position, there
nevertheless is contrary authority giving retroactive effect to a com-
parative negligence statute.2 8
The Minnesota comparative negligence statute applies to any action
STAT. ANN. § 60-258(b) (1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (Law. Co-op 1974); N. H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (WestSupp. 1980); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW§
1413 (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036
(1973).
19. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 27-1765 (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (1977); GA.
CODE ANN. § 94-703 (1972); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to 6-806 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156
(1980); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §
41.141 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to 78-27-43 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
4.22.010-.020 (Supp. 1980).
20. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 8.4 (1974).
21. 211 Wis. 344, 247 N.W. 449 (1933).
22. 54 Wis. 2d 388, 195 N.W.2d 635 (1972).
23. 54 Wis. 2d 415, 195 N.W.2d 461 (1972).
24. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 8.4 (1974).
25. Id. See Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 789 (1936).
26. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 8.1 (1974). See, e.g., Fuller v. Illinois Cent.
Ry. Co., 100 Miss. 705,56 So. 783 (1911); Joseph v. Lowery, 261 Or. 545, 495 P.2d 273 (1972); Lupie v.
Hartzheim, 54 Wis. 2d 415,195 N.W.2d461 (1972); Holzemv. Mueller, 54 Wis. 2d 388, 195 N.W.2d 635
(1972); Brewster v. Ludtke, 211 Wis. 344,247 N.W. 449 (1933). It should be noted, however, that this
position applies only when a court is interpreting a statute that adopts comparative negligence; in those
jurisdictions in which comparative negligence has been judicially adopted, the courts have tended to
give retroactive effect to the newdoctrine. See Kaatzv. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Liv. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Thorton v. Elliott, 288 So. 2d 254
(Fla. 1974); Williams v. Seaboard Atlantic Ry. Co., 283 So. 2d 33 (Fla.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935
(1973); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275
N.W.2d 511 (1979); Rivers v. Ford Motor Co., 90 Mich. App. 94,280 N.W.2d 875 (1979). See also H.
WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT §§ 16:4-16:8 (1978 & Supp. 1980).
27. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 8.4 (1974).
28. See Peterson v. Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 173 N.W.2d 353 (1969); Godfrey v. State, 84
Wash. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975). See also Raymond v. Jenard, 390 A.2d 358 (R.I. 1979).
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"which is commenced after July 1, 1969.,,29 In Peterson v. Minneapolis,30
in which the plaintiff was injured on April 24, 1967 but did not commence
his action until July 2, 1969, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
trial court and held that the state legislature intended that the statute apply
retroactively to cases in which the cause of action accrued before the
effective date of the statute but were not commenced until after that date.31
Similar to the Minnesota statute, the Rhode Island comparative
negligence provision, enacted on July 16, 1971, applies to "all actions
hereafter brought. 32 In Raymond v. Jenard,33 the plaintiff was injured
before the effective date of the statute but did not file his law suit until after
the effective date.34 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the statute
applied retroactively on the ground that the action was "brought" after the
effective date of the statute.35
In Godfrey v. State,36 the Supreme Court of Washington construed a
comparative negligence statute that, unlike the apparent relative clarity of
the Minnesota and Rhode Island statutes, provides only that it "takes
effect as of 12:01 a.m. on April 1, 1974." 37 Although the plaintiff in
Godfrey was injured before this date, the court gave complete retroactive
effect to the statute.38 Like the Minnesota court in Peterson,39 the
Washington Supreme Court brushed aside arguments that retroactivity
was precluded because the defendant had a vested right in the common law
defense of contributory negligence40 or because retroactive application of
the statute would deny equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment.41 Rather, the court proceeded to find a legislative intent to
apply the statute retroactively in the title of the statute, "An Act Relating
to Civil Procedure, 42 and in the purpose of the statute to abrogate the
harsh consequences of the common law doctrine of contributory
negligence.43 On the former basis for finding legislative intent, the court
ruled that a merely procedural enactment is to be retroactively applied;44
on the latter basis, the court stated that "[ilt would be incongruous indeed
29. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979).
30. 285 Minn. 282, 173 N.W.2d 353 (1969).
31. Id. at 287, 173 N.W.2d at 356. See also Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91,193
N.W.2d 305 (1971) (reaffirming Peterson).
32. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1980).
33. 390 A.2d 358 (R.I. 1978).
34. Id. at 358.
35. Id. at 359.
36. 84 Wash. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975).
37. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.900 (1976). Since the Washington statute gave only an "effective
date" rather than a date after which it would apply to actions subsequently commenced, it more closely
resembles the Ohio statute than do the acts of Minnesota or Rhode Island.
38. Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 968, 530 P.2d 630, 635 (1975).
39. Peterson v. Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 290, 173 N.W.2d 353, 358 (1969).
40. Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 962, 530 P.2d 630, 631 (1975).
41. Id. at 962-63, 530 P.2d at 632.
42. 1973 WASH. LAWS ch. 138.
43. Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 966-67, 530 P.2d 630, 633-34 (1975).
44. Id. at 633, 530 P.2d at 966.
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to frustrate this obvious legislative change in policy by adopting a position
that would permit the rejected bar to recovery [of common law
contributory negligence] to continue in operation for years to come. 4 5
Despite a certain equitable appeal, the Godfrey, Peterson, and
Raymond position is clearly a minority view and it is doubtful that the
Ohio courts will follow their lead; indeed, one commentator has termed the
Godfrey rationale a "thin basis" for finding legislative intent to apply
comparative negligence retroactively. 6 Although, like the majority of
jurisdictions, these courts have at least given lip-service to the "legislative
intent" test of retroactivity, 47 it appears that the majority "presumption of
prospectivity 48 and the concomitant conclusion that comparative neg-
ligence statutes silent on the question of retroactivity will not be given
retroactive effect is too firmly established to be lightly set aside.
49
Although it is doubtful that Ohio will follow the minority example, it
also does not appear that, at least initially, it will employ the traditional
"legislative intent" test of the majority to determine whether the
comparative negligence statute will have retroactive effect. Rather, in the
initial stages of analysis, the Ohio courts must focus upon whether the
statute is substantive or procedural. Under article II of the Ohio
Constitution the general assembly has no power to enact a retroactive
law.5 ° Nevertheless, the Ohio courts have construed this prohibition to
apply only to laws that are substantive rather than procedural in their
effect. 5' As a result, the ability to apply the Ohio Comparative Negligence
Act retroactively hinges upon the hazy distinction between substance and
procedure.
In State ex rel. Holdridge v. Industrial Commission,52 the Ohio
Supreme Court attempted to shed light on the substance-procedure
dichotomy:
It is doubtful if a perfect definition of "substantive law" or "procedural
or remedial law" could be devised. However, the authorities agree that, in
general terms, substantive law is that which creates duties, rights, and
obligations, while procedural or remedial law prescribes methods of
enforcement of rights or obtaining redress.53
45. Id. at 967, 530 P.2d at 634.
46. H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 16:3 (1978).
47. Id. See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra. See also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE § 8.4 (1974).
48. See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra. See also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE § 8.4 (1974).
49. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 8.4 (1974). See also Winfree v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co., 227 U.S. 296 (1913).
50. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28.
51. Denicola v. Providence Hosp., 57 Ohio St. 2d 115, 387 N.E.2d 231 (1979); State ex rel.
Slaughter v. Industrial Comm'n, 132 Ohio St. 537,9 N.E.2d 505 (1937); Smith v. New York Cent. Rd.
Co., 122 Ohio St. 45, 170 N.E. 637 (1930).
52. 11 Ohio St. 2d 175, 228 N.E.2d 621 (1967).
53. Id. at 178, 228 N.E.2d at 623. Similarly, in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 14(1941),
the United States Supreme Court defined "procedure" as "the judicial process for enforcing rights and
1980]
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Using the Holdridge definition, it is unclear whether the Ohio statute
creates certain rights or whether it merely affects those remedies that are
available if substantive rights are abridged. If substantive, retroactivity
clearly is precluded by the Ohio Constitution.14 In Smith v. New York
Central Road Company," however, the court held that a statute of
limitations is procedural and thus can be applied retroactively. 6 Based on
the Smith rationale, an argument can be forwarded that the doctrine of
comparative negligence is very much like a statute of limitations: both
relate to available remedies rather than to vested rights.
57
If the Ohio courts accept the analogy between comparative negligence
and statutes of limitations, thus holding that the Ohio statute is merely a
procedural or remedial rule that may be applied retroactively, the courts
will be squarely faced with the crux of the retroactivity analysis that has
been used by the majority of other jurisdictions that have considered the
question-whether the Ohio legislature intended the statute to have a
retroactive effect.5 8 Since the Ohio statute is silent on this point, reference
must be made to the Ohio Revised Code's rules of statutory construction,
which embody the presumption of prospectivity upon which most other
courts have relied to hold that a comparative negligence statute is to have
only a prospective effect.59 Section 1.48 of the Code provides that "[a]
statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made
retrospective."60 Although this section appears to be a clear statement of
legislative intent and thus should preclude retroactive application of the
Ohio Comparative Negligence Act, the Ohio courts have not read the
provision strictly and have permitted remedial statutes to be retroactive
even though they contain no express statement to that effect. 1 Indeed, in
Denicola v. Providence Hospital,62 the Ohio Supreme Court indicated that
a procedural or remedial statute should be applied to all cases tried after
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them."
54. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
55. 122 Ohio St. 45, 170 N.E. 637 (1930).
56. Id. at 49, 170 N.E. at 638. See Denicola v. Providence Hosp., 57 Ohio St. 2d 115,387 N.E.2d
231 (1979); Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 242 N.E.2d 658 (1968); State ex rel. Holdridge v.
Industrial Comm'n, II Ohio St. 2d 175, 228 N.E.2d 621 (1967).
57. See generally, V. SCHWARTz, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 8.4 (1974).
58. See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra.
59. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 8.1 (1974). See, e.g., Fuller v. Illinois Cent.
Ry. Co., 100 Miss. 705, 56 So. 783 (1911).
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.48 (Page 1978). See Clifford Jacobs Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 357 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (determining that OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.73-.74
apply only prospectively); Columbus v. Vest, 42 Ohio App. 2d 83, 330 N.E.2d 726 (Franklin County
1974) (determining that OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.71-.73 apply only prospectively).
61. E.g., Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70,242 N.E.2d 658 (1968); state exrel. Holdridgev.
Industrial Comm'n, I1 Ohio St. 2d 175, 228 N.E.2d (1967); Beckman v. State, 122 Ohio St. 443, 5
N.E.2d 482 (1930); Smith v. New York Cent. Rd. Co., 122 Ohio St. 45, 170 N.E. 637(1930); Cassero v.
Cassero, 50 Ohio App. 2d 368, 363 N.E.2d 753 (Cuyahoga County 1976).
62. 57 Ohio St. 2d 115, 387 N.E.2d 231 (1979).
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the effective date of the statute, even though the cause of action arose
before that date.63
Although the Denicola decision may provide a way around the
prospectivity presumption of the Code, most courts have refused to adopt
this type of rationale when considering comparative negligence, holding
instead that a prospective course must be followed. 4 Ohio will likely
follow this lead. It is interesting to note that since 1908 Ohio, by statute,
has applied comparative negligence principles to railroad employees
seeking damages from their employers.65 In Hill v. Pere Marquette
Railroad Company 6 the court held this statute to have only a prospective
operation.67 The Hill rationale, which is in accord with the decisions from
most other jurisdictions, is the likely Ohio view and would forbid
retroactive operation of the Comparative Negligence Act.
In sum, if an Ohio court considering the retroactivity of the Ohio
Comparative Negligence Act finds that it is procedural or remedial rather
than substantive, and thus may be retroactive, the court must determine
whether the general assembly intended the statute to be retroactive. The
statute's silence on this point, coupled with Ohio precedent, the view of the
majority of other jurisdictions, and the Code's presumption of prospectivi-
ty, indicates that the Act should be given only prospective effect.68
III. WILLFUL, WANTON AND RECKLESS MISCONDUCT
Is the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act applicable to cases of willful,
wanton, or reckless misconduct by a defendant? As with so many other
questions, the statute is painfully silent on the point.
Dean Prosser defines this type of behavior as conduct by which
the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in
disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have
been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow. It usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to the
consequences, amounting almost to willingess that they shall follow; and it
has been said that this is indispensable.6 9
The comparative negligence statute provides that it is applicable only
63. Id. at 118, 387 N.E.2d at 233.
64. See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra. See also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE § 8 (1974).
65. Ouio REV. CODE ANN. § 4973.09 (Page 1977).
66. 20 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 236,31 Ohio C.C. Dec. 282 (1912), aff'dwithout opinion, 88 Ohio St. 599
(1913).
67. Id. at 239, 31 Ohio C.C. Dec. at 285.
68. Compare Hockman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692 (1960), and Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A
Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775,789 (1936), with Comment, JudicialAdoption
of Comparative Negligence in Ohio, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 811, 816-17 (1975).
69. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TilE LAW OF ToRTs § 34 (4th ed. 1971).
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to "negligence" actions. 70 Is an action alleging willful or wanton mis-
conduct or recklessness a negligence action for the purposes of the statute?
Much of the answer to this question hinges upon how the courts define this
type of misconduct.
Initially, it is apparent that "willful" misconduct may connote be-
havior more onerous than "wanton or reckless" misconduct.7 ' Some
courts have drawn the distinction, equating "willfulness" with "knowing or
intentional" conduct.72 If willful conduct is given this meaning, it is clear
that it falls outside of the realm of comparative negligence; there is virtual
unanimity that neither contributory nor comparative negligence will bar
or reduce recovery in a suit for an intentional tort.73
Most jurisdictions, however, appear to have lumped willful behavior
in with wanton and reckless misconduct, creating a somewhat amorphous
level of culpability that is more dire than garden-variety negligence but
does not rise to the level of an intentional tort.74 When this type of
conceptual framework is employed, whether comparative negligence
applies generally depends upon the distinction between recklessness and
negligence and whether contributory negligence is a defense to reck-
lessness.75
In Payne v. Vance,76 the Ohio Supreme Court, referring to the dis-
tinction between negligence and willful, wanton, and reckless behavior,
stated:
A defendant might be guilty of the grossest negligence and his acts might be
fraught with the direst consequences without having those elements of intent
and purpose necessary to constitute willful tort. A willful tort . . . can only
be predicated upon knowledge of danger, with reckless disregard of the
consequence after discovering the danger. It is of course not necessary that
the defendant should have knowledge of the peril of any particular person, or
70. Amended S. 165,113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHIO LEGIS. SERV. LAWS OF OHIO
5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(1)]. See note 1 supra.
71. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (4th ed. 1971); V. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.3 (1974). In Falls v. Mortensen, 207 Ore. 130, 142-43,295 P.2d 182,187-
88 (1956), the Oregon Supreme Court appeared to reach the frustrated conclusion that"willfulness" is
hopelessly ambiguous.
72. See Farmers Ins. Exeh. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246,258,143 N.W.2d 230,238 (1966);
V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.3 (1974).
73. E.g., Munoz v. Olin, 76 Cal. App. 3d 85, 142 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1977); Carman v. Heber, 601
P.2d 646 (Colo. App. 1979); Finnigan v. Sandoval, 600 P.2d 123 (Colo. App. 1979); Moore v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 26 Okla. 682, 110 P. 1059 (1910); MeCrary v. Taylor, 579
S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963); Schulzev.
Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OFTORTS §
66 (4th ed. 1971); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.2 (1974); H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE
CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 7:1 (1978). But see Comer v. Gregory, 365 So. 2d 1212 (Miss. 1978);
Sindle v. New York City Transit Auth., 33 N.Y.2d 293, 352 N.Y.S.2d 183, 307 N.E.2d 245 (1973);
Comment, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts, 12 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 179 (1978).
74. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.3 (1974). See also Donnelly v. Southern
Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 118 P.2d 465 (1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
75. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 5.1, 5.3 (1974).
76. 103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N.E. 85 (1921).
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that he should have intended to do injury to some particular person, but, on
the other hand, any general knowledge of information that other persons are
placed in a position of peril by his reckless and heedless conduct would
amount to a legal willful tort. This doctrine is based upon the well-known
principle that a person is presumed to intend the natural and logical
consequences of his acts. An illustration of this statement would be that of a
person who would ride a wild and highly excited horse into a crowded street
on a public festival day."
The Payne decision not only indicates that Ohio does not classify
willful misconduct as an intentional tort but rather groups it with
recklessness or wanton behavior,78 it also clearly illustrates the distinct
status that recklessness holds in relation to ordinary negligence. 79 At least
prior to the adoption of comparative negligence in Ohio, contributory
negligence by the plaintiff was not a defense to an action alleging willful or
wanton misconduct.80 In Kellerman v. Durig Co., 81 the Ohio Supreme
Court stated that "where willful or wanton misconduct exist[s], plaintiff's
negligence is not available as a defense. 82 This principle is in accord with
the vast weight of authority from other jurisdictions.8 3 Following this
rationale, it thus appears that since contributory negligence did not
preclude a plaintiff's claim for willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct
prior to the comparative negligence statute, it should not now serve to
lessen the plaintiff's recovery. Exactly this result has been reached by a
number of courts. In Danculovich v. Brown,84 the Wyoming Supreme
Court held that its comparative negligence statute does not apply when the
77. Id. at 69, 133 N.E. at 88. See Roszmanv. Sammett, 26 Ohio St. 2d 94, 269 N.E.2d420 (1971).
78. In defining willful misconduct, the Payne court equates it with recklessness and states that no
specific intent or knowledge is necessary. 103 Ohio St. at 69, 133 N.E. at 88. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965) (defting recklessness). Although in Reserve Trucking Co. v.
Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519,531,191 N.E. 745,750 (1934) and Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520,526,
80 N.E.2d 122, 126 (1948) the court indicated that willfulness held a distinct status in relation to wanton
or reckless behavior, as distinguished by their respective degrees of intent or purpose, the distinction
was never clear by any means, see Payne v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59,69, 133 N.E.85, 88 (1921), and does
not appear to have been followed with any consistency, see Kellerman v. Durig Co., 176 Ohio St. 320,
323, 199 N.E.2d 562, 565 (1964); Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567,573-74,200
N.E. 843, 846 (1936).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
80. Kellerman v. Durig Co., 176 Ohio St. 320, 199 N.E.2d 562(1964); Universal Concrete Pipe
Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843 (1936).
81. 176 Ohio St. 320, 199 N.E.2d 562 (1964).
82. Id. at 323, 199 N.E.2d at 565.
83. Wallin v. Fuller, 476 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Alabama law); Price v. Lowman,
373 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967) (applying South Carolina law); Scholz v. United States, 271 F. Supp. I I 1
(D.C. Conn. 1967) (applying Connecticut law); Turkett v. Wedgeworth, 289 Ala. 106,266 So. 2d 265
(1972); Evans v. Pickett, 102Ariz. 393,430 P.2d 412 (1967); Hewko v. G.I. Trucking Co., 242 Cal. App.
2d 738, 51 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1966); National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Holland, 269 So. 2d 407 (Fla. App.
1972), cert. denied, 273 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1973); Bogle v. Conway, 198 Kan. 166, 422 P.2d 971 (1967);
Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 52 Misc. 2d 404, 276 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. Tomplans Co. 1966); Vaughn v.
Baxter, 488 P.2d 1234 (Okla. 1971); Elliott v. Rogers Constr., Inc., 257 Or. 421,479 P.2d 753 (1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 481, 482, 500 (1965); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.1 (1974); H. WOODS, THE
NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 7:2 (1978).
84. 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979).
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defendant has acted willfully or wantonly. 85 A similar result was reached
by the Supreme Court of Nevada in Davies v. Butter,86 in which the court
held that although a defendant's gross negligence would be compared to a
plaintiff's contributory negligence, no similar comparison should occur
when the defendant is liable for wanton or willful misbehavior.87 In Ryan
v. Foster & Marshall, Inc.,88 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
Oregon law, went even a step further, holding that a plaintiff's
contributory negligence is not to be offset against a defendant's gross
negligence.89 Since gross negligence is less culpable than wanton, willful, or
reckless misconduct, 90 the Ryan holding also clearly precludes application
of principles of comparative fault when the defendant has acted in a
wanton, willful, or reckless fashion.
Although Danculovich, Davies, and Ryan are consistent with the
common law principle that contributory negligence is no defense to willful,
wanton, or reckless misconduct, 9' other courts have looked to the
purposes of the common law concept and, having concluded that they are
no longer viable under the doctrine of comparative fault, have proceeded
to reduce a contributorily negligent plaintiff's recovery even though the
defendant's conduct rose to the level of willfulness or recklessness. 92
The bases for the common law rule that contributory negligence is no
defense to willful, wanton, or reckless behavior appear to be threefold:
first, the defendant's culpability in this context is of a wholly different kind
than that of a contributorily negligent plaintiff;93 second, and closely
related to the first, since the defendant's culpability rises nearly to the level
of an intentional tort, he should not be allowed to benefit from the
defense; 94 and third, courts traditionally have been more than willing to
find ways to avoid the harsh consequences of the total bar of contributory
negligence. 95
Once a jurisdiction has adopted the doctrine of comparative fault, the
third basis for the common law rule is eliminated. 96 Moreover, the first
85. Id. at 194.
86. 602 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1979).
87. Id. at 610. In Draney v. Bachman, 138 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (1976), theNewJersey
Superior Court indicated that, like Davies, although gross negligence would be compared with a
plaintiff's contributory negligence, willful, wanton or reckless misconduct would not. 138 N.J. Super.
at 514, 351 A.2d at 415. See also Burd v. Vercruyssen, 142 N.J. Super. 344, 361 A.2d 571 (1976).
88. 556 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1977).
89. Id. at 465.
90. See Davies v. Butter, 602 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1979); Burdv. Vercruyssen, 142N.J. Super. 344, 361
A.2d 571 (1976); Draney v. Bachman, 138 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (1976).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 481, 482, 500 (1965).
92. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.3 (1974); H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE
CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 7:2 (1978).
93. Falls v. Mortensen, 207 Or. 130, 139, 295 P.2d 182, 187 (1956).
94. Id. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.3 (1974).
95. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971).
96. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.3 (1974).
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basis, differing kinds of fault, becomes more an issue whether different
levels of culpability can be compared rather than whether they should
preclude each other. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,97 in which the California
Supreme Court judicially adopted comparative negligence, the court
addressed this latter issue by stating that "a comprehensive system of
comparative negligence should allow for apportionment of damages in all
cases involving misconduct which falls short of intentional."98 The cases
holding that principles of comparative fault apply in actions based upon
strict or products liability also indicate that differing levels of culpability
can be the subject of comparision. 99
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Bielski v. Schulze'00 squarely
addressed the question whether recklessness is subject to comparative fault
and, contrary to Dranculovich, Davies, and Ryan, held that it is. In
Bielski, the court ruled that the common law principle has no purpose
under comparative negligence and that apportionment of damages should
occur unless the defendant has committed an intentional tort.10' A similar
result has been reached by the courts in Billingsley v. Westrac Company'
0 2
and Rone v. Miller.'°3
In interpreting the Ohio statute, the courts will be faced with the
choice of following Dranculovich, thus denying application of the statute
when the defendant has acted in a willful, wanton, or reckless manner, or
Bielski, thus holding that the defendant's willfulness or recklessness is to be
compared with the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Consistency with
Ohio precedent developed prior to comparative negligence would require
taking the former course and holding that comparative negligence does not
apply to willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct. This result seems
particulary compelling since comparative negligence is merely a substitute
for the absolute bar of contributory negligence, rather than a complete
rewriting of substantive law. Moreover, to hold otherwise would allow a
defendant who has acted in a willful or reckless fashion to benefit from a
plaintiff's negligence, a result never reached under former law and one that
seemingly has been ignored by the Bielski, Billingsley, and Rone courts.
Although the other bases for the common law principle that contributory
negligence is no defense to recklessness may have been eliminated or
97. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
98. Id. at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
99. E.g., Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Hagenbuch v. Snap-
On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.C.N.H. 1972); Sturm, Roger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska
1979); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Lippes
v. Atlantic Bank, 69 A.D. 2d 127, 419 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967).
100. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
101. Id. at 17, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
102. 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying Arkansas law).
103. 257 Ark. 791, 520 S.W.2d 268 (1975).
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modified by the advent of comparative negligence,'0 4 this basis appears to
remain intact.
If the Ohio courts decide to follow the Bielski line of decisions and
apportion damages when the defendant is guilty of willful, wanton, or
reckless misbehavior, the question arises whether punitive as well as
compensatory damages should be apportioned. There is some Ohio
authority that wanton misconduct supports an award of punitive
damages.' 05
Like so many issues that arise under comparative fault, other
jurisdictions are split on this issue. Some courts apportion punitive
damages,'0 6 while others do not,10 7 holding that the policy of punishing
wanton acts must be preserved and viewing the concepts of apportionment
and punishment as exclusive and incompatible.0 8
The Ohio Comparative Negligence Act speaks of apportioning only
those damages caused by the negligent conduct of another person-in
other words, compensatory damages. Punitive damages are not caused by
the tortfeas or; rather, they are awarded to punish and deter extraordinary
conduct motivated by actual malice.'0 9 Considering that apportionment
frustrates the purpose of punitive damages, Ohio courts, if they ever face
this issue, should probably not apportion punitive damages.
IV. PARTIES UNDER DISABILITY
In deciding whether a party has exercised due care, the courts
generally apply an objective standard and do not take into account the
infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education that may affect
human behavior. " There are situations, however, in which the courts will
consider the individual circumstances of a party in determining whether he
has satisfied his duty of due care, particularly if the party is a child or an
adult with a diminished mental capacity.
104. See text accompanying notes 93-99 supra.
105. Davis v. Tunison, 168 Ohio St. 471, 155 N.E.2d 904 (1959). It should be noted that this issue
may arise regardless whether the Ohio courts decide to apportion responsibility between a plaintiff's
negligence and a defendant's willfulness or recklessness. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 921 (1979)
provides:
Compensatory damages are not diminished by the fact that the injured person provoked the
tortfeasor; but the provocation is considered in determining the allowance and amount of
punitive damages.
Although section 921 applies to intentional torts, "provocation" may be equated with contributory
negligence and thus become a consideration in determining whether a contributorily negligent plaintiff
is entitled to punitive damages and, if so, whether the award should be reduced to reflect the plaintiff's
fault.
106. E.g., Pedernales Elec. Corp., Inc. v. Schultz, 583 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
107. E.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27 (D.C. Fla. 1973).
108. Id. at 38.
109. Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946).




Rather than hold children to the objective standard of reasonable care
that is generally required of adults, the courts have tested a child's
negligence according to how a reasonable child of similar age, intelligence,
and experience would act under the circumstances. 11' Some jurisdictions,
including Ohio, have afforded additional protection to children by
erecting a series of presumptions that children under the age of seven are
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence or contributory
negligence 12 while children under the age of fourteen are rebuttably
presumed to be incapable of negligence.13
These principles are not altered by the Ohio Comparative Negligence
Act. As a result, plaintiffs under the age of seven will continue to have any
contributory negligence on their part ignored and will be entitled to a full
recovery for their injuries despite the statute, while plaintiffs under the age
of fourteen will be treated in a similar fashion unless the presumption of
incapability of negligence is rebutted, in which case the child-plaintiff's
contributory negligence will serve to reduce his recovery by a propor-
tionate amount. 14 Recovery for child-plaintiffs over the age of fourteen
and found negligent under the "similar age, intelligence, and experience"
standard' 15 should be determined in a like manner.
B. Diminished Mental Capacity
Although at odds with a true fault system, the traditional rule of the
law of torts is that diminished mental capacity or even insanity will not
relieve a negligent defendant from liability." 6 When the contributory
negligence of a plaintiff with a dimished mental capacity is at issue,
however, the law has taken a different tack. In most jurisdictions, a
plaintiff's negligence is wholly ignored if the plaintiff is totally insane.17
Ohio, along with a minority of other jurisdictions, has taken this principle
one step further, holding that diminished capacity not rising to the level of
Ill. Id. Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965), however, ifa child engages
"in an activity which is normally undertaken only by adults, and for which adult qualifications are
required," the child will be held to an adult standard of care. See Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107
N.W.2d 859 (1961).
112. Holbrock v. Hamilton Distributing Co., 11 Ohio St. 2d 185, 228 N.E.2d 628 (1967).
113. See Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE § 14.1 (1974).
114. Although this appears to be the plain operation of the Ohio statute, note should be made of
the Wisconsin doctrine that a child-plaintiff's contributory negligence must be tested twice; first to
determine whether the child was in fact contributorily negligent and second in comparing the child's
fault with that of the defendant. See Blahnik v. Dix, 22 Wis. 2d 67, 125 N.W.2d 364 (1963). See also
Gremban v. Burke, 33 Wis. 2d 1, 146 N.W.2d 453 (1966); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §
16.1 (1974).
115. See text accompanying note Ill supra.
116. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 135 (4th ed. 1971).
117. Annotation, Contributory Negligence of Mentally Incompetent or Mentally or Emotional-
ly Disturbed Persons, 91 A.L.R.2d 392, 399 (1963).
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total insanity must nevertheless be considered in determining whether the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent.1 8 Although the Ohio position has
been criticized because of its unwieldiness and the easy escape from
liability that it may offer for an accident-prone plaintiff,'1 9 it does not ap-
pear to have been affected by enactment of the comparative negligence
statute. Rather, if upon considering the plaintiff's diminished capacity the
trier of fact finds the plaintiff incapable of contributory negligence under
the circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to a full recovery. Conversely, if
a plaintiff is found contributorily negligent regardless of his diminished
capacity, the statute will operate to lessen his recovery.
20
V. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
It is a fundamental principle of the law of torts that liability for
negligence must be premised upon breach of an applicable standard of
conduct.121 This legal duty generally is the one required by the common
law-namely, the ordinary care of a reasonable person. 22 Nevertheless,
legal duty also may be established by legislation prescribing that certain
acts shall or shall not be done to protect the person or property of others
from a risk of harm.123 As a general proposition, violation of such a statute
amounts to breach of the standard of care-in other words, negligence per
se. 124 In Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon,125 the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the
parameters of this doctrine as it applies in Ohio:
The standard of conduct as to due care to be exercised by one for the
protection of others may be specifically established by legislative enactment;
by judicial decision; or, in the absence of legislative enactment or judicial
decision, by a consideration of the facts and circumstances of a particular
case. Where a legislative enactment imposes upon any person a specific duty
for the protection of others, and his neglect to perform that duty proximately
results in injury to such another, he is negligent per se or as a matter of law.
Where there exists a legislative enactment commanding or prohibiting for the
safety of others the doing of a specific act and there is a violation of such
enactment solely by one whose duty it is to obey it, such violation constitutes
118. Feldman v. Howard, 5 Ohio App. 2d 65,68,214 N.E.2d 235,237 (Franklin County 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 10 Ohio St. 2d 189,226 N.E.2d 564 (1967). See Snider v. Callahan, 250 F. Supp.
1022 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
119. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 14.3 (1974). Professor Schwartz ac-
knowledges, however, that the flexibility of the Ohio rule is more appropriate to a true fault system.
120. Of course, if the plaintiff's contributory negligence exceeds the negligence of the parties
against whom recovery is sought, all recovery is precluded. See note I supra.
121. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). See also Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co., 87 Ohio App. 8,86 N.E.2d 324
(1949), aff'd, 153 Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E.2d 859 (1950).
122. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 at 190 n.31 (4th ed. 1971). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
123. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971); V. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 6.1 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285, 286 (1965).
124. See authority cited in note 123 supra.
125. 161 Ohio St. 367, 119 N.E.2d 440 (1954).
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negligence per se; but where there exists a legislative enactment expressing for
the safety of others, in general or abstract terms, a rule of conduct, negligence
per se has no application and liability must be determined by the application
of the test of due care as exercised by a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances of the case.
26
As can be seen from the rule of law laid down by Eisenhuth,
negligence per se does not adhere to every violation of statute; rather, a
breach of legal duty as a matter of law will be found only when the statute
at issue proscribes or prescribes specific conduct for the protection of
others. 27 Examples of negligence per se include furnishing a firearm to a
minor, 2 1 failing to furnish a handrail for a stairway in a public place,
129
and failing to maintain the brakes of a motor vehicle in good working
order. 130
Contributory negligence generally is a defense to negligence per se.
13 1
Consequently, whenever prior to adoption of the Ohio Comparative
Negligence Act the plaintiff's contributory negligence would have barred
his action for negligence per se, the principles of comparative negligence
should now apply to reduce recovery in an amount proportionate to the
plaintiff's fault. 32 Although at first glance there appears to be a problem in
allocating the proportions of negligence to the parties when the
defendant's negligence is founded upon negligence per se rather than upon
breach of the ordinary care expected of a reasonable person, the difficulty
is in fact illusory. Negligence per se does not mean that the defendant's
fault is greater than, lesser than, or even equal to the negligence of the
plaintiff; rather, it means only that the defendant has been negligent,
without any reflection upon the degree to which that negligence
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. 1 Apportionment of damages is
a wholly unrelated question; once it is determined that the plaintiff has
been contributorily negligent and the defendant has been negligent per se,
the relevant inquiry is to what extent the defendant's statutory violation,
and conversely, the plaintiff's contributory fault, caused the harm. Under
the Ohio statute, if the defendant's breach of a statutorily prescribed
126. Id. at 367, 119 N.E.2d at 440.
127. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
128. Taylor v. Webster, 12 Ohio St. 2d 53, 231 N.E.2d 870 (1967) [violation of OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4301.22(B) (Page 1973)].
129. Torok v. Stambaugh Thompson Co., 36 Ohio Law Abs. 193,43 N.E.2d 653 (Mahoning
County Ct. App. 1938) [violation of OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4107.14 (Page 1973)].
130. Spalding v. Waxier, 2 Ohio St. 2d 1, 205 N.E.2d 890 (1965) [violation of OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4513.20 (Page 1973)].
131. Patton v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N.E.2d 597 (1939); V. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 6.2 (1974); Annotation, Contributory Negligence as a Defense to a Cause
of Action Based upon Violation of Statute, 10 A.L.R.2d 853 (1950).
132. Petersonv. Haule, 304 Minn. 160, 230 N.W.2d51 (1975); Immchuckv. Fullerton, 299 Minn.
91, 216 N.W.2d 683 (1974); Johnson v. Chemical Supply Co., 38 Wis. 2d 194, 156 N.W.2d 455 (1968);
Presser v. Siesel Constr. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 54, 119 N.W.2d 405 (1963); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE § 6.2 (1974); H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 10:2 (1978).
133. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 6.2 (1974).
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standard of care is found to be an equal or greater cause of the injury than
the plaintiff's negligence, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover his total
damages less an amount equal to that portion of the fault attributable to
the plaintiff. Conversely, if the fault attributed to the plaintiff is greater
than the fault attributed to the defendant's violation of statute, the plaintiff
can have no recovery.
34
There are, however, certain exceptions to the general rule that a
plaintiff's contributory fault is a defense to negligence per se. The first is
when, in conjunction with the statute that the defendant has violated, the
legislature has expressly stated that contributory negligence is no
defense. '35 In such an instance, any fault on the part of the plaintiff will be
ignored and, even under comparative negligence, the plaintiff is entitled to
full recovery.
136
The second exception is somewhat more elusive. Although the case
law is vague and much of it is inconsistent, 137 as a general proposition
contributory negligence is no defense to negligence per se when the
plaintiff belongs to a class of persons that the statute violated by the
defendant was intended to protect because of their inability to protect
themselves. 38 The effect of comparative negligence upon this exception
has resulted in a split of authority among the jurisdictions. In Hartwell
Handle Company v. Jack,139 the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that a
child-plaintiff's contributory negligence would not serve to reduce his
recovery under comparative fault principles since the statute violated by
the defendant, a child labor law, was designed "to protect the child . . .
from the consequences of imprudence, negligence, or lack of care or
caution, which on account of the immaturity of youth and the lack of
experience, discretion, and judgment is characteristic of children within
the prohibited age."' 40 The court went on to state that to allow a
comparison of fault "would defeat the very purpose of the statute."' 41 In
134. The example assumes that all potentially liable parties are before the court. For a discussion
of absent tortfeasors and the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act, see text accompanying notes 205-29
infra.
135. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 6.2 (1974); H. WooDs, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE:
COMPARATIVE FAULT §10:1 (1978).
136. Bond v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 233 Ark. 32,342 S.W.2d 473 (1961). See authority cited in
note 135 supra.
137. Compare Wertzv. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 152 Neb. 451,41 N.W.2d 740 (1950), with
Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
138. Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 109 So. 2d 189, cert. discharged, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959);
Bennett Drug Stories v. Mosely, 67 Ga. App. 347, 20 S.E.2d 208 (1942); Hartwell Handle Co. v. Jack,
149 Miss. 465, 115 So. 586 (1928); Koeingv. Patrick Constr. Corp. 298 N.Y. 313,83 N.E.2d 133 (1948);
Skarpness v. Port of Seattle, 52 Wash. 2d 490, 326 P.2d 747 (1958); H. WOODs, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE:
COMPARATIVE FAULT § 10:3 (1978); Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of
Statute, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 105, 118-21 (1948). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 comment
c (1965).
139. 149 Miss. 465, 115 So. 586 (1928).
140. Id. at 477, 115 So. at 588.
141. Id., 115 So. at 588.
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Presser v. Siesel Construction Company,142 however, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court held that a plaintiff's contributory fault and a defendant's
negligence per se would be compared even though the statute violated by
the defendant was intended to protect the class of persons to which the
plaintiff belonged.143 The court rejected the exception to the rule that
contributory negligence is a defense to negligence per se, stating that the
issue "as a matter of public policy has been committed to the doctrine of
comparative negligence."'144 Although the Presser position is more
compatible with a true fault system and may be preferable in some
situations because of the difficulty inherent in attempting to determine
whether a plaintiff falls within a protected class, 45 the better approach
seems to be that of the Mississippi courts, since protective legislation
otherwise would be emasculated. 46 If this view is adopted, a plaintiff's
fault will be ignored under comparative negligence and, as with the first
exception, the plaintiff receives a full recovery.
A closely related issue is the effect of partial comparative negligence
upon a plaintiff's contributory negligence per se. Although it has been
suggested that violation of a statute by the plaintiff should, as a matter of
law, be construed as fault greater than that of the defendant,147 thus
barring any recovery by the plaintiff, this approach has not been adopted.
Rather, the courts consistently have held that the issue of the relative fault
of the parties should be submitted to the jury.148
VI. LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The most commonly applied modification of the strict rule of
contributory negligence is the doctrine of last chance.1 49 Last clear chance
is defined by the Restatement in the following manner:
A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of harm from the
defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm caused thereby if,
immediately preceding the harm, (a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the
exercise of reasonable vigilance and care, and (b) the defendant is negligent in
failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing
opportunity to avoid the harm.150
There generally are two recognized types of last clear chance. The first
142. 19 Wis. 2d 54, 119 N.W.2d 405 (1963).
143. Id. at 64-65, 119 N.W.2d at411.
144. Id. at 66, 119 N.W.2d at 411.
145. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 6.2 (1974).
146. See H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 10:4 (1978).
147. See the defendant's argument in Johns v. Secress, 106 Ga. App. 96, 126 S.E.2d 296 (1962).
The court, however, rejected this contention. Id. at 98, 126 S.E.2d at 298.
148. E.g., Johns v. Secress, 106 Ga. App. 96, 126 S.E.2d 2;6 (1962); Johnson v. Chemical Supply
Co., 38 Wis. 2d 194, 156 N.W.2d 455 (1968); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 6.3 (1974).
149. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 66 (4th ed. 1971).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 (1965).
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is "conscious last clear chance" when the plaintiff negligently places
himself in a dangerous position and the defendant discovers the danger in
time to avoid it but fails to do so. The second is "unconscious last clear
chance" when the defendant does not discover the danger but is under a
duty to discover it.151
During its experience with contributory negligence, Ohio followed
the former "conscious" variety of last clear chance, with the Ohio Supreme
Court defining use of the theory as follows:
Where a plaintiff, by his own fault, caused himself to be placed in a
perilous situation, he may recover under the rule of the "last clear chance,"
notwithstanding his negligence, if the defendant did not, after becoming
aware of the plaintiff's perilous situations, exercise ordinary care to avoid
injuring him ....
For the doctrine of "last clear chance" to be applicable it must be proved
that the defendant became aware that plaintiff was in a position of peril at a
time and distance when, in the exercise of ordinary care, he could have
avoided injuring plaintiff.1 12
Several rationales have been used to somewhat unsatisfactorily
explain the rule. The most common is that when the defendant has the last
chance to act, his act and not the plaintiff's prior negligence is the
"proximate cause" of the accident.'53 Another rationale suggests that the
later negligence of the defendant involves a higher degree of fault.
54
Finally, many commentators and courts submit that the real explanation
for last clear chance is to limit the harsh effect of the contributory
negligence denial of plaintiff's recovery.1 55
The rationale for the existence of last clear chance has been critical to
states' decisions whether the doctrine will continue under comparative
fault. In those states that have considered the question, the results are
mixed. In Georgia, Nebraska, and South Dakota the doctrine survives. 156
These jurisdictions generally have analyzed clear chance in terms of
proximate cause, concluding that last clear chance survives under
comparative negligence since the defendant's last negligent act was the sole
legal cause of the injury. As an example, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota explained:
151. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 66 (4th ed. 1971); H. WOODS, COM-
PARATIVE FAULT § 8:1 (1978). Note that in the case of an inattentive plaintiff the defendant must usually
be conscious of the plaintiff's situation in order that the plaintiff be able to recover. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 480 (1965).
152. Peters v. B & F Transfer Co., 7 Ohio St. 2d 143 (1966).
153. See, e.g., Bragg v. Central New England R. Co., 228 N.Y. 54, 126 N.E. 253 (1920).
154. See, e.g., Rawitzer v. St. Paul City R. Co., 93 Minn. 84, 100 N.W. 664 (1904).
155. See, e.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2nd Cir. 1964); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 66 (4th ed. 1971).
156. Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 211 Ga. 665, 85 S.E.2d 542 (1955); Whitehouse v.
Thompson, 150 Neb. 370, 34 N.W.2d 385 (1948); Ulach v. Wynan, 78 S.D. 504, 104 N.W.2d 817
(1960). It should be noted that Georgia has a system of partial comparative negligence while Nebraska
and South Dakota have adopted the slight-gross variation of this doctrine. V. ScHVARTz,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 3.4(B), 3.5(B) (1974).
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This court views the doctrine of last clear chance as a rule of proximate
cause . . . that is the subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to
exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring the plaintiff becomes the immediate
or proximate and efficient cause of the accident, which intervenes between the
accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff. . . . Considered as
a rule of proximate cause the common law doctrine of last clear chance is not
incompatible or in conflict with our statutory rule of comparative negli-
gence. . . . Accordingly, if the doctrine applies, plaintiff's contributory
negligence, regardless of degree, would not bar recovery.
57
The overwhelming number of commentators, however, have
suggested that last clear chance is out of harmony with comparative
negligence-a system that requires each party to bear the cost of his own
fault."'58 Likewise, most jurisdictions considering the issue have abolished
last clear chance after adopting comparative fault. Connecticut and
Oregon have abolished the doctrine by statute. 159 Maine, Florida,
California, Alaska, Colorado, Texas, Wyoming, and New York' 6° have
abolished it judicially. Florida, California, and Alaska, which have pure
comparative negligence, have asserted unequivocally that last clear chance
has no place in a comparative fault system.1 6 The Alaska Supreme Court
explains this position as follows:
[I]t is recognized by nearly all who have reflected upon the subject that the last
clear chance doctrine is, in the final analysis, merely a means of ameliorating
the harshness of the contributory negligence rule. Without the contributory
negligence rule there would be no need for the palliative doctrine of last clear
chance. To give continued life to that principle would defeat the very purpose
of the comparative negligence rule-the apportionment of damages
according to the degree of mutual fault. There is, therefore, no longer any
reason for resort to the doctrine of last clear chance in the courts of Alaska. 
162
States adopting only partial comparative fault systems have also
rejected last clear chance as a vestigial and unnecessary part of the former
contributory negligence system. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
fully discussed the issue in Cushman v. Perkins:
163
The justifications for the last clear chance doctrine most frequently given
are that because the plaintiff's negligence has ceased or is remote or because
157. Ulach v. Wyman, 78 S.D. 504, 507, 104 N.W.2d 817, 819 (1960).
158. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 7.2 (1974).
159. CONN. PUB. ACTS 73-622 § 1(c) (1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1979).
160. H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 8:3 (1978 & Supp. 1980). See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d
1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975);
Burns v. Ollati, 513 P.2d 469 (Colo. App. 1973); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973);
Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968); Dominguez v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit
Operating Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 528, 388 N.E.2d 1221, 415 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1979); French v. Grigsby, 567
S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979).
161. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Alaska 1975); Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,
829, 532 P. 2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,874 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431,438 (Fla.
1973).
162. Kaatz v. State, 540 P. 2d 1037, 1040 (Alaska 1975).
163. 245 A.2d 846 (Me. 1968).
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the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the harm, the negligence of
the defendant must be the sole proximate cause . . . [But] [in such a case the
negligence of the plaintiff undoubtedly has been a cause, and a substantial
and important one, of his own damage. . . While the extent of such a
plaintiff's negligence and the efficiency of its causation may be less than a
defendant's, it would appear to us that the negligence of a plaintiff who gets
himself into a situation of peril cannot reasonably be excluded as a proximate
cause of an injury the very danger of which he should have anticipated.' 64
We conclude that the last clear chance rule is but a modification of the
doctrine of contributory negligence. In our view when our contributory
negligence rule as an absolute bar disappeared (in cases where the plaintiff's
negligence is less than the defendant's) through legislative action, the last
clear chance rule disappeared with it and no longer exists as an absolute
rule. 6
It appears from a survey of other states' responses to last clear chance
under comparative negligence that those states which analyze the doctrine
in terms of proximate cause retain it and those states which view the
doctrine as one to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negligence
abolish it.
Since the Ohio comparative negligence statute is silent regarding the
destiny of last clear chance, the basic rationale used to support the doctrine
in Ohio is likely, as in other jurisdiction, to be partially determinative of its
fate.
The precise reasoning that Ohio uses to underpin its use of this rule,
however, is unclear. Some courts essentially have treated the doctrine as a
modification of contributory negligence. For example, in West Receiver v.
Gillette1 66 the court accentuated the modification of contributory negli-
gence with only casual mention of the proximate cause analysis:
It seems to be now generally agreed that this doctrine of "last chance" is a
humane modification of the strict and rigid rule which denies to a plaintiff
under all circumstances any recovery for the negligence of a defendant, where
the plaintiff has himself, contributed to the injury by his own negligence. The
application of this rigid rule was in many cases found to work injustice, for it
would surely be unjust to hold that one should be denied the protection of the
law because of acts of carelessness on his part, which were followed by
subsequent acts of negligence on the part of another which latter acts were the
proximate cause of injury. 167
At other times, the Ohio courts have emphasized treating the rule of
last clear chance in terms of proximate and remote causes. In Drown v.
Northern Ohio Traction Co. 168 the court analyzed last clear chance as
follows:
Now, it must'be apparent upon even a slight analysis of this rule that it
164. Id. at 847-49.
165. Id. at 850.
166. 95 Ohio St. 305, 116 N.E. 521 (1917).
167. Idat 311, 116 N.E. at 522.
168. 76 Ohio St. 234, 81 N.E. 326 (1907).
[Vol. 41:585
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
can be applied only in cases where the negligence of the defendant is
proximate and that of the plaintiff remote; for if the plaintiff and the
defendant both be negligent and the negligence of both be concurrent and
directly contributing to produce the accident, then the case is one of
contributory negligence pure and simple. But if the plaintiff's negligence
merely put him in the place of danger and stopped there, not actively
continuing until the moment of the accident and the defendant either knew of
his danger, or by the exercise of such diligence as the law imposes on him
would have known it, then if the plaintiff's negligence did not concurrently
combine with the defendant's negligence to produce the injury, the
defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the injury and that of the
plaintiff is a remote cause. That is all there is of the so called doctrine of "the
last clear chance."'
169
If the Ohio last clear chance doctrine is analyzed as resulting from a
somewhat dubious proximate and remote cause theory, then it should
survive because the question is one of causation and not contributory
negligence. If, on the other hand, the Ohio doctrine is considered ajudicial
attempt to alleviate the harshness of contributory negligence, then it may
no longer be necessary and may be viewed as supplanted by comparative
fault principles.
It should be noted, however, that contributory negligence still exists
in Ohio as an absolute bar to recovery when the plaintiff is more than fifty
percent negligent. To that extent, it is still possible that last clear chance
could mitigate the harshness of this remnant of contributory negligence. 
170
If last clear chance is retained in order to mitigate the harshness for a
plaintiff who is more than fifty percent at fault in a partial comparative
fault system, the jurisdiction must live with the anomaly that a forty-five
percent negligent plaintiff will get fifty-five percent of his damages while a
fifty-five percent negligent plaintiff will get one hundred percent of his
damages when the defendant had a last clear chance. This jurisdiction,
then, also must endure the reverse harshness to the defendant who, under
the last clear chance doctrine, becomes fully liable when two are at fault. In
the final analysis, it must be remembered that the goal of a comparative
negligence system is to require each party to bear liability in proportion to
his fault, 171 a goal inconsistent with the all-or-nothing result of last clear
chance.
VII. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The advent of the doctrine of comparative negligence likely has
created more confusion and inconsistency in the area of the defense of
169. Id. at 248, 81 N.E. at 329.
170. The Supreme Court of Maine, although abolishing last clear chance under its partial
comparative fault system, recognized that the doctrine might still apply under a diluted comparative
negligence system of slight-gross negligence where contributory negligence had more virility. Cushman
v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846, 850 (Me. 1968). See also, V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 7.2
(1974).
171. IV. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67 (4th ed. 1971).
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assumption of risk than in any other area of the law of negligence. Al-
though the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act compares negligence and
contributory negligence, as with so many other questions it is silent on
whether negligence can be compared with assumption of risk. Does
assumption of risk continue to bar a plaintiff's recovery or has it merged
with contributory negligence, thus becoming subject to comparison and an
allocation of fault?
A. The Parameters of Assumption of Risk
While contributory negligence traditionally has been defined in
objective terms as the care that a reasonable person would exercise for his
or her own safety,1 72 objectivity takes a back seat when the issue is whether
a plaintiff assumed a risk. Rather, assumption of risk contemplates that
the plaintiff voluntarily and consciously encounters a subjectively known
risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent conduct.173 The risk
assumed must always be an unreasonable risk; assumption of risk serves
no purpose if the risk assumed is a reasonable one. The defense arises from
a two-step process: first, the plaintiff subjectively perceives the potential
danger of the defendant's negligence; and second, the plaintiff makes a
conscious choice to risk the danger.
Although the defense has been broken down into innumerable
categories, analysis of the impact of comparative negligence upon
assumption of risk can be satisfactorily accomplished by the three
traditional categories: (1) express assumption of risk; (2) implied
reasonable assumption of risk; and (3) implied unreasonable assumption
of risk. 1
74
Express assumption of risk is the easiest to define. It constitutes an
explicit statement by the plaintiff, in a contract or otherwise, that the
plaintiff agrees to assume the risk of injury from the defendant's
negligence. 175 When no express statement has been made by the plaintiff
but he nevertheless fully appreciates the danger potentially presented by
negligence on the part of the defendant and consciously chooses to
confront that danger, the plaintiff impliedly assumes the risk. 176 If the
choice made by the plaintiff is one that would have been made by a
reasonable person, the plaintiff's conduct is within the scope of implied
172. Id. at § 65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
173. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, Assumption
of Risk in a Comparative Negligence System-Doctrinal, Practical, and Policy Issues: Kennedy v.
Providence Hockey Club, Inc.; Blackburn v. Dorta, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 364, 366 (1978). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496B, 496C (1965).
174. Comment, Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Negligence System-Doctrinal,
Practical, and Policy Issues: Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.; Blackburn v. Dorta, 39 OHIO
ST. L.J. 364, 367 (1978).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965). See Comment, Assumption of Risk in a
Comparative Negligence System-Doctrinal, Practical, and Policy Issues: Kennedy v. Providence
Hockey Club, Inc.; Blackburn v. Dorta, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 364, 367 (1978).
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reasonable assumption of risk; 177 conversely, if the plaintiff's choice is
objectively unreasonable, the plaintiff impliedly and unreasonably as-
sumes the risk of the defendant's negligence. 178 This latter type of the de-
fense-implied unreasonable assumption of risk-contemplates both the
subjective, conscious, voluntary, and knowing choice elements of assump-
tion of risk and the objective, reasonable person elements of contribu-
tory negligence. 179 As a result, it can be characterized as either and, when it
is present, a defendant generally can assert both defenses." 0 Because of
this doctrinal overlap, it causes the most difficult problems when a com-
parative negligence system is adopted.
B. Express Assumption of Risk and Comparative Negligence
Express assumption of risk has its roots in contract and waiver; it is
said to relieve the defendant of any duty that he otherwise would owe to the
plaintiff'8 ' and thus has little, if anything, to do with contributory or
comparative negligence. Although an express agreement to assume a risk
of negligence may be held unenforceable because of a lack of bargaining
parity, 8 2 it seems clear that when the parties are in a relatively equal
bargaining position, an express assumption of risk should be a valid and
total defense unaffected by the doctrine of comparative negligence.
Indeed, the other jurisdictions that-have considered the issue have reached
just this result.'83
C. Implied Assumption of Risk and Comparative Negligence
In the absence of comparative negligence, distinguishing between
implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence is of little practical
importance since both defenses operate as a total bar to recovery. 184 Once
comparative negligence has been adopted, however, the distinction
becomes critical.' 85 If a plaintiff is contributorily negligent, his damages
are apportioned; if he has assumed the risk, however, his recovery will
hinge upon how the jurisdiction interprets assumption of risk.
177. Comment, Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Negligence System-Doctrinal, Prac-
tical, and Policy Issues: Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.; Blackburn v. Dorta, 39 OHIo ST.
L.J. 364, 367 (1978).
178. Id.
179. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971).
180. Id.
181. Comment, Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Negligence System-Doctrinal,
Practical, and Policy Issues: Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.; Blackburn v. Dorta, 39 OHIo
ST. L.J. 364, 368 (1978).
182. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971); V. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.2 (1974).
183. E.g., Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Becker v. Beaverton
School Div. No. 48,551 P.2d 498 (Or. App. 1976); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86,515
P.2d 821 (1973); Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63 (1963). See V. SCHWARTZ,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.2 (1974).
184. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1943); Packard v. Quesnel, 112 Vt.
175, 22 A.2d 164 (1941).
185. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.1 (1974).
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One commentator has suggested three approaches that ajurisdiction
may take with respect to implied assumption of risk and comparative
negligence:
(1) that assumption of risk is unaffected by the adoption of comparative
negligence, and that it therefore remains a complete bar to recovery, (2) that
assumption of risk, though retaining an existence independent from
contributory negligence, is no longer a bar to recovery but is instead to be
entered into the calculus for determining the relative contributions of the
plaintiff and defendant to the injury suffered, or (3) that assumption of risk is
abolished as a defense separate from contributory negligence. 8 6
Given the distinction between implied reasonable assumption of risk and
implied unreasonable assumption of risk, with the latter encompassing not
only the subjective aspects of the former but also the negligence elements of
contributory fault, the approach taken by a jurisdiction may be different
for each type.' 87
The Ohio courts generally have failed to recognize the distinction
between contributory negligence and implied assumption of risk and often
confuse them, speaking of the former when the latter is involved, or of
assumption of risk when the particular risk assumed is not apparent. 88
Courts also talk of assumption of risk or contributory negligence when, in
fact, neither is applicable because the defendant owes no duty of
reasonable care to the plaintiff 89 or the defendant has performed his duty
and thus is not negligent.' 90 The confusion is compounded by the
assumption of risk instruction recommended by Ohio Jury Instruction
255.11,'9' which says, in effect, that a plaintiff has assumed a known risk
when he is aware of the danger, or the danger is so obvious that he must be
taken to know it, and he has had a definite opportunity to avoid it by use of
ordinary care.
192
Under comparative negligence, the distinctions are of the utmost
importance. Although a party may be found both to be contributorily
negligent and to have assumed the risk, the two defenses are neither
necessarily inclusive or exclusive. 193 Each defense is supported by a
different policy; that behind contributory negligence is to deter
186. Comment, Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Negligence System-Doctrinal,
Practical, and Policy Issues: Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.; Blackburn v. Dorta, 39 OHIo
ST. L.J. 364, 369-70 (1978).
187. Id. at 370.
188. See Bishop v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 39 Ohio App. 2d 185, 188-89, 316 N.E.2d 907, 910
(1974); Haarmeyer v. Roth, 113 Ohio App. 74, 177 N.E.2d 507 (1960).
189. See, e.g., Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
190. See Cincinnati Base Ball Club Co. v. Eno, 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925); Ivory v.
Cincinnati Base Ball Club Co., 62 Ohio App. 514, 24 N.E.2d 837 (1939).
191. 2 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Ohio Judicial Conf.) § 255.11 (1970).
192. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A; adopted in Ohio in Temple v. Wean United,
Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 322, 364 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1977), further treats assumption of risk and
foreseeable misuse of a product as forms of contributory negligence.
193. DeAmiches v. Popczun, 35 Ohio St. 2d 180, 186, 299 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1973).
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blameworthy conduct and to prevent a party from profiting by his own
fault, while the underlying basis for assumption of risk is to give a party the
freedom of choice. A man who is injured rushing into a burning building to
obtain his hat may find an action in negligence barred by both assumption
of risk and contributory negligence. A paraplegic who is injured by
ingesting an unreasonably dangerous drug to prevent infection in his
disabled limbs, but who takes the drug fully conscious of the risks in order
to avoid having his limbs amputated, may not be contributorily negligent
because his behavior is reasonable under the circumstances, but may be
found to have voluntarily assumed the risk of harm.
The other jurisdictions that have considered the impact of com-
parative negligence upon implied reasonable assumption of risk have split
on the issue, resulting in a gamut of decisions that cover each of the three
alternatives suggested earlier. 94 In Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club,
Inc. 1' and Bartlett v. Gregg,196 the Supreme Courts of Rhode Island and
South Dakota respectively held that reasonable assumption of risk is
unaffected by the adoption of comparative negligence and that it remains a
total defense to a negligence action. 97 This position seems impossible to
support, however, in light of the resulting anomaly that a plaintiff who acts
reasonably but assumes an unreasonable risk will totally be denied
recovery while a plaintiff who has acted unreasonably and thus with
greater culpability by being contributorily negligent will be permitted a
recovery, albeit a diminished one.' 98 Because of this anomaly, a number of
jurisdictions have held that, under comparative fault, reasonable
assumption of risk will no longer be a total bar to recovery but rather has
merged with contributory negligence and thus will serve to diminish a
plaintiff's recovery. 199 Although this result avoids the obvious inconsisten-
cies of the Kennedy and Bartlett rationale, it nevertheless remains subject
to the traditional criticism leveled against reasonable assumption of risk
that one should not be penalized for acting in a reasonable manner. The
merger position also creates an anomaly of its own; a plaintiff who acts
reasonably will be treated the same as an unreasonable plaintiff, while a
defendant who acts reasonably and thus without fault is absolved of all
liability.
194. See text accompanying note 163 supra.
195. 376 A.2d 329 (R.I.1977).
196. 77 S.D. 406, 92 N.W.2d 654 (1958).
197. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 333 (R.I. 1977); Bartlett v. Gregg,
77 S.D. 406,413, 92 N.W. 2d 654, 658 (1958). See also Rone v. Miller, 257 Ark. 791,520 S.W.2d 268
(1975).
198. Comment, Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Negligence System-Doctrinal, Prac-
tical, and Policy Issues: Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.; Blackburn v. Dorta, 39 OHIO ST.
L.J. 364, 375 (1978).
199. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Wentz v. Deseth, 221
N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1974); Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Brittain v. Booth,
601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979).
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Because of the problems inherent in treating reasonable assumption
of risk as either unaffected or merged with comparative negligence,
perhaps the best approach is to follow the Florida Supreme Court's lead in
Blackburn v. Dorta20 0 and hold that the defense of reasonable assumption
of risk is abolished and will serve neither to preclude a plaintiff nor to
lessen his recovery.20 ' Since a plaintiff who has reasonably assumed a risk
has, by definition, acted without fault and in the manner that would be
expected of an ordinary member of society, penalizing the plaintiff by
diminishing his recovery appears at odds with the purposes of a true fault
system. In other words, if fault is defined in terms of unreasonable
behavior, no fault should result in no loss.
Although, for obvious reasons, the alternatives with respect to
implied unreasonable assumption of the risk are lessened to two, the
impact of comparative negligence upon this defense presents a somewhat
more difficult choice. To hold that it remains a total defense, as many
202courts have done, finds support in the fact that a plaintiff who has
unreasonably assumed a known unreasonable risk not only has the
culpability of one who acts negligently, but this culpability has been
heightened by the plaintiff's subjective awareness that he was acting in an
unreasonable fashion. This "dual culpability" has led many courts to look
with little sympathy upon one who unreasonably assumes an unreasonable
risk.20 3
Nevertheless, even though a plaintiff has knowingly acted negligently,
the defendant may also have acted unreasonably; and it is the combined
negligence of both parties that has caused the injury forming the basis of
the litigation. As a result, consistency with a true fault system would
appear to require that a plaintiff's unreasonable assumption of risk be
compared with the defendant's negligence. The majority of courts that
have considered this question have reached just this result.204 To hold
otherwise merely serves to continue the viability of the "all or nothing"
approach of the common law, an approach that, at least with respect to
200. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
201. Id. at 293. See Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821(1973); Colson
v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N.W.2d 21 (1962).
202. See Rone v. Miller, 257 Ark. 791, 520 S.W.2d 268 (1975); Spradlinv. Klump, 244 Ark. 841,
427 S.W.2d 542 (1968); Yankey v. Battle, 122 Ga. App. 275, 176 S.E.2d 714 (1970); Wade v. Roberts,
118 Ga. App. 284, 163 S.E.2d 343 (1968); Roberts v. King, 102 Ga. App. 518, 116 S.E.2d 885 (1960);
Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814,29 So.2d 646 (1947); Fritchley v. Love-Courson Drilling Co., 177 Neb.
455, 129 N.W.2d 515 (1964); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1977).
203. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 9.3-9.5 (1974).
204. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976);
Dilorio v. Tipaldi, 4 Mass. App. 640,357 N.E.2d 319 (1976); Springrosev. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23,192
N.W.2d 826 (1971); Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So.2d 669 (Miss. 1973); Kopischke v. First
Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668 (Mont. 1980); Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1974); Becker
v. Beaverton Sch. Dist. No. 48, 25 Or. App. 879, 551 P.2d 498 (1976); Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529
S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86,515 P.2d 821 (1973); Gilsonv.
Drees, 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63 (1963); Colson v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N.W.2d 21 (1962);
Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (,Vyo. 1979).
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unreasonable conduct, has expressly been rejected by the legislature in its
adoption of comparative fault.
VIII. ABSENT TORTFEASORS
A pair of intertwined issues arises when, because of failure of service
of process or for some other reason, all of the appropriate party-
defendants are not before the court. First, must the court consider the
negligence of absent tortfeasors in determining whether the plaintiff can
recover? Second, assuming that the plaintiff can recover, must the
negligence of absent tortfeasors be taken into account when apportioning
fault among those liable to the plaintiff?
The first question is the easiest to answer. The Ohio Comparative
Negligence Act provides that a plaintiff may recover only if his
contributory negligence is "no greater than the combined negligence of all
other persons from whom recovery is sought". 205 Assume that the plaintiff,
a passenger in an auto driven by her husband, is seriously injured in an
accident between her husband's vehicle and one driven by the defendant.
Since the doctrine of interspousal immunity continues to remain viable in
Ohio, 0 6 the plaintiff cannot sue her husband. In her action against the
defendant, if the jury finds her to be ten percent negligent while the
defendant is twenty percent negligent, she will be allowed to recover since
her fault does not exceed that of the defendant. If the findings are reversed,
however, with twenty percent of the fault allocated to the plaintiff and ten
percent to the defendant, her action will be totally barred. The plain
language of the statute indicates that only the negligence attributable to
those persons against whom a judgment is in fact sought should be
considered in determining whether a plaintiff has a right to recovery.
The second issue, whether the apportionment of fault should include
both parties and nonparties, is considerably more complex. Assume that
the plaintiff is negligently injured by three persons (for convenience,
referred to as tortfeasor(l), tortfeasor(2), and tortfeasor(3), respectively),
but can obtain jurisdiction only over tortfeasor(l). The jury finds the
plaintiff's damages to be $10,000 and determines that the plaintiff is ten
percent contributorily negligent while tortfeasor(1) is responsible for thirty
percent of the fault. The remaining sixty percent of the total negligence
consequently is attributable to absent tortfeasors(2) and (3). In
determining the portion of damages for which each person is liable, the
Ohio Comparative Negligence Act instructs the court to multiply the
amount of recoverable damages by a fraction in which the numerator is the
person's percentage of negligence and the denominator is the total of the
205. Amended S. 165, 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHIO LEGIS. SERv. LAWs OF
OHIO 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(1)].
206. See Varhollav. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269,383 N.E.2d 888 (1978); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio
St. 2d 243,208 N.E.2d 533 (1965). See also Recent Development Note, The Needfor Legislative Action
to Abolish Interspousal Immunity: Varholla v. Varholla, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 771 (1979).
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percentages of negligence attributable to all persons from whom recovery
is allowed. °7 If, in the example, the court uses only the negligence of
tortfeasor(l) in calculating the denominator of the fraction, tortfeasor(l)
will be liable for all of the plaintiff's recoverable damages, $9,000.208 On
the other hand, if the court computes the denominator by using the total of
the fault attributable to tortfeasors (1), (2), and (3), ninety percent,
tortfeasor(l) will be liable for only one-third of the plaintiff's recoverable
damages, or $3,000.209
Since a court cannot enter judgment or allow recovery against
nonparties, there is an argument that the combined percentage of fault of
tortfeasors(2) and (3), who have not been joined nor been given a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the claims against them, should not be included
in apportioning fault. If successful, however, this argument would allow a
plaintiff to frustrate the policy of the comparative negligence statute by
choosing his defendants. In a situation in which a plaintiff is injured by two
tortfeasors, one of whom is insured while the other is judgment-proof, the
plaintiff can proceed against only the insured tortfeasor and recover all of
his damages, save those attributable to his own fault. The result is that an
insured defendant will be liable for more than his proportional share of the
damages, a result contrary to the language and spirit of the statute.
Other jurisdictions have split on this question, with South Dakota
taking the lead in holding that the negligence of absent tortfeasors will not
be considered in apportioning liability among party-defendants. 0 In
Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Company211  and American
Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, the Supreme Courts of
Wisconsin and California, respectively, reached the opposite conclusion,
holding that apportionment should be based upon the combined
negligence of all tortfeasors who contributed to the plaintiff's injuries,
regardless of whether they are joined as party-defendants.213 Both courts,
however, conditioned their holdings on the parallel rule, viable in each
jurisdiction, 2 4 that negligent tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable.215
207. Amended S. 165, 113th Gen Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHIO LEGIS. SERV. LAws OF
OHIO 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2)]. See text
accompanying note 13 supra.
208. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
209. Id.
210. Beck v. Wessel, 237 N.W.2d 905 (S.D. 1976). See Kapchuck v. Orlan, 332 So. 2d 671 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Conner v. Mertz, 274 Or. 657, 548 P.2d 975 (1976).
211. 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
212. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, (1978).
213. Walker V. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 535, 252 N.W. 721,727 (1934);
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 589 n.2, 578 P.2d 899,906 n.2,146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 189 n.2, (1978). The strength of this rule in Wisconsin is questionable, however. See Ross v.
Koberstein, 220 Wis. 73, 264 N.W. 642 (1936) (even though apportionment was not based upon the
fault of all tortfeasors, there was not prejudicial error).
214. For a discussion of the impact of the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act upon the doctrine
of joint and several liability in Ohio, see text accompanying notes 230-39 infra.
215. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 536, 252 N.W. 721, 728 (1934);
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The outcome in Ohio likely depends upon the interpretation given to
the language "all persons from whom recovery is allowed. 216 This
language, which defines those persons whose negligence shall be taken into
account in apportioning liability, conceivably is subject to three
constructions, two of which would permit a court to consider the fault of
all tortfeasors, not just those who have been made parties.
Although the statute can be construed as allowing apportionment
only among those tortfeasors actually joined by the plaintiff as party-
defendants to the litigation, such a construction does not appear consistent
with the portion of the statute that defines whether a complainant can
recover at all.217 In determining whether a plaintiff can recover, the Act
dictates that the fault of the plaintiff be compared with the combined fault
of those "persons from whom recovery is sought. 218 As indicated earlier,
this provision clearly is limited to only those tortfeasors actuallyjoined.219
The portion of the statute relating to apportionment of liability, "persons
from whom recovery is allowed,,220 indicates a broader scope than
"persons from whom recovery is sought."
A court could partly implement this broader construction, and thus
hold that apportionment requires consideration of the fault of all
tortfeasors, by holding that "allowed" contemplates not only those persons
joined as party-defendants but also those persons joined as third-party
defendants pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 14221 or as persons
necessary for complete and adequate relief pursuant to rule 19.222
Although this construction of the statute would still allow apportionment
among only those persons actually joined in the action, this broader
interpretation of who is joined would at times allow apportionment to be
based upon the negligence of all tortfeasors rather than only those named
by the plaintiff as party-defendants.
Perhaps the most satisfactory interpretation of "persons from whom
recovery is allowed" 223 is that which has been adopted in Kansas, whose
comparative negligence statute contains identical language.224 In order to
allow apportionment of liability to be based upon the fault of all
tortfeasors, the court in Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equipment,
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 590, 578 P.2d 899, 906-07, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 189-90, (1978).
216. Amended S. 165, 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHio LEGIS. SERV. LAWS OF
OHIO 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2)].
217. Id. [to be codified at OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(1)].
218. Id.
219. See text accompanying notes 171-72 supra.
220. Amended S. 165, 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHio LEGIS. SERV. LAWS OF
OHIO 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2)] (emphasis added).
221. OHio R. Civ. P. 14 (Page 1971).
222. OHIo R. CiV. P. 19 (Page 1971).
223. See Amended S. 165, 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHIO LEoIS. SERv. LAws OF
OHIO 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2)].
224. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1963).
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InC.22 5 rejected an interpretation of "allowed" as meaning only those
persons actually joined and held that "allowed," for purposes of
apportionment, includes not only those tortfeasors against whom the
plaintiff actually seeks relief but also all those tortfeasors whose negligence
causally relates to the plaintiff's injuries and against whom recovery would
be allowed by law.226
In sum, an Ohio court may give one of three interpretations to
"persons from whom recovery is allowed," each of which will cause a
different result in the number of tortfeasors whose fault may be considered
in apportioning liability among defendents. First, if the statute is
construed to mean only those persons actually joined by the complainant,
the fault of absent tortfeasors cannot be taken into account in
apportioning liability.227 Second, if the language is held to mean both
tortfeasors actually joined by the plaintiff and tortfeasors joined as third-
party defendants or necessary parties, apportionment in some instances
would be based upon the fault of all tortfeasors.22 8 Third, if the Kansas
approach is followed and the provision is interpreted to mean all
tortfeasors against whom recovery would be allowed by law (i.e. all
persons guilty of causal negligence even though not joined), apportion-
ment would always reflect the fault of all tortfeasors, whether joined or
not.229 Since one of the basic purposes of the statute is to apportion liability
according to individual fault and since this result is best achieved only by
considering the negligence of all tortfeasors, whether or not they are
technical parties, the third interpretation appears to be the preferable
approach.
IX. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Prior to the enactment of the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act, it
was clear that the principle ofjoint and several liability of tortfeasors was
generally accepted and applied.230 The statute, however, which provides
that "each person against whom recovery is allowed is liable to the person
bringing the action for a portion of the total damages . .. ,23 may have
abolished joint and several liability, at least when a plaintiff has been
contributorily negligent. Liability "for a portion" is not joint and several
liability for the entirety. 232
225. 437 F. Supp. 707 (D.C. Kan. 1977).
226. Id. at 712.
227. See text accompanying notes 183-86 supra.
228. See text accompanying notes 187-88 supra.
229. See text accompanying notes 189-92 supra.
230. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31-.32 (Page Supp. 1979) (contribution among joint
tortfeasors). See also 52 OHIO JUR. 2d Torts § 19 (1962).
231. Amended S. 165, 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHIO LEGIS. SERv. LAws OF
OHIO 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2)].
232. See Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 321 A.2d 74 (1974).
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Other jurisdictions have dealt with this issue in a number of ways.
The comparative negligence statute of Nevada has explicitly abolished
joint liability.2 3 On the other hand, the statutes of a number of states retain
the doctrine.234 Other comparative negligence states have kept joint
liability through court decisions.235 In Vermont, whose statute resembles
the Ohio Act, 236 and Kansas, whose statute is identical to the Ohio Act,
237
however, the courts have held that, under comparative negligence, joint
and several liability is abolished.238
Given this array of positions from other jurisdictions, the issue in
Ohio appears to be wide open. Nevertheless, since the General Assembly
recently enacted a statute allowing contribution among joint
tortfeasors,239 which would become ineffective in negligence actions ifjoint
and several liability is abolished, and since the Comparative Negligence
Act does not expressly abolish joint and several liability, there appears to
be good reason to believe that the doctrine will remain viable under
comparative negligence. Moreover, to hold that the statute abolishesjoint
and several liability would result in the anomaly that defendants may be
jointly and severally liable when the plaintiff is not at fault, but notjointly
and severally liable when the plaintiff is contributorily negligent.
Additionally, different standards could apply in the same case. For
example, joint and several liability would not exist for a contributorily
negligent driver, but could still obtain for the benefit of his passengers.
These results may make the statute constitutionally defective.
Whichever position one takes, there is no escaping the question of the
continued viability of joint and several liability in negligence actions, since
the statutory language is obviously susceptible of a construction
abolishing the doctrine. At the most, one can confidently predict a heated
judicial challenge to either point of view.
X. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Most courts that have considered the question have held that the
vicarious liability of an employer for the negligence of an employee acting
233. NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.141(3)a(b) (1979).
234. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975), OR.
REv. STAT. § 18.485 (1979); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-40(2) (1953).
235. Gazawayv. Nicholson, 109 Ga. App. 510,136 S.E.2d425 (1964): Saucierv. Walker, 203 So.
2d 299 (Miss. 1967); Caldwell v. Piggly-Wiggly Madison Co., 32 Wis. 2d 447, 145 N.W.2d 745 (1966).
See Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc. v. Edrington, 259 Ark. 600,534 S.W.2d 225 (1976); American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, (1978); Dunham v.
Kampman, 547 P.2d 263 (Colo. 1975); Mihoy v. Proulx, 113 N.H. 698, 313 A.2d 723 (1973); Rice v.
Hyster Co., 273 Or. 191,540 P.2d 989 (1975); Fitzgerald v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 67 Wis. 2d 321,
227 N.W.2d 444 (1975).
236. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973).
237. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a)(d) (1975).
238. Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284,580 P.2d 876 (1978); Brown v. Keil, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867
(1978); Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 321 A.2d 74 (1974).
239. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.31-.32 (Page Supp. 1979).
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within the scope of his employment is not affected by the adoption of
comparative negligence.240 Since the purpose of respondeat superior, to
shift responsibility to one who is financially responsible and has benefited
from the enterprise causing the negligence, 24 does not appearto be at odds
with the purposes of a comparative system, the doctrine should not be
altered by comparative fault and should continue to operate as before. For
example, an employee negligently injures a child while driving his
employer's delivery vehicle and the child, alleging negligent operation of
the vehicle, sues the employer. If the jury finds the employee eighty percent
at fault while attributing twenty percent of the negligence to the child, and
finds that the employee was acting with the scope of his employment, then
the employer is liable for eighty percent of the child's damages. Assume,
however, that the child sues alleging both negligent operation of the vehicle
by the employee and negligent entrustment of the vehicle by the employer
to the employee. If the child prevails on both theories of recovery, thejury
will have to make an apportionment of liability between the employer and
the employee. If the jury finds the employee sixty percent responsible and
the employer twenty percent responsible, then the employer will be both
twenty percent personally liable and, assuming that the employee was
acting within the scope of his employment, sixty percent vicariously liable.
XI. SET-OFF
In an action for negligence the defendant may counterclaim against
the plaintiff in the same suit. When this occurs under a fifty percent
comparative fault system such as Ohio's, it is entirely possible that both the
plaintiff and defendant can recover damages from each other. If the court
finds that the fault is divided equally between a single plaintiff and a single
counterclaiming defendant, then both parties will theoretically recover
under Ohio's statute since neither party's fault is greater than that of his
adversary.242 The recovery of the party who was entitled to the lesser
amount, however, would subsequently be set-off against the amount this
party owed to the other.243 A set-off thereby reduces the amount of final
judgment owed to the party gaining the greatest recovery but eliminates
the need for him to pay the remaining judgment to his opponent.
Assume, for illustration, that a fifty percent negligent plaintiff suffers
240. See Dearing v. Ferrell, 165 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Pennebakerv. Parker, 232 Miss.
725, 100 So. 2d 363 (1958); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Creekmore, 199 Miss. 48, 23 So. 2d 250 (1945);
Loper v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. Co., 166 Miss. 79, 145 So. 743 (1933); Hall v. McDonald,
229 Wis. 472, 282 N.W. 561 (1938).
241. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.1 (1974).
242. Note that if a single plaintiff and single defendant were found to be anything other than each
50% negligent no set-off would be possible since recovery would be denied to the party whose fault was
greater than the fault of the other. See Amended S. 165 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprintedin OHIO
LEGIS. SERV. LAWS OF OHIO 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2315.19(A)(1)].
243. H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 17:2 (1978).
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$10,000 damages while a fifty percent negligent counterclaiming defendant
suffers $20,000 in damages. The plaintiff consequently owes $10,000 to the
defendant and the defendant, in turn, owes $5,000 to the plaintiff. Under
the set-off doctrine, the plaintiff can off-set the award against him by the
$5,000 due him from the defendant and thus pay to the defendant only the
remaining $5,000 due.244
Although the Ohio statute is silent regarding set-off, the text does not
preclude such a practice and Ohio generally recognizes that one judgment
may be set off against another as long as it does not infringe upon another's
rights.245 In addition, nine states with a similar fifty percent comparative
fault statute do utilize the set-off procedure.246 It is therefore probable that
Ohio will likewise use set-off in two-party comparative negligence actions,
when appropriate.
Similarly, though a more complex computation will be involved, set-
off should be available in Ohio in actions involving multiple parties
provided the party claiming damage has fault not greater than the
combined negligence of his adversaries. 247 For example,248 assume in a
three-vehicle collision driver A with $80,000 damage brings an action
against drivers B and C for his damages. B with $100,000 damages and C
with $60,000 damages then counter-claim against A and crossclaim against
each other. Fault is apportioned thirty percent to A, forty percent to B and
thirty percent to C. Before set-off, A would recover seventy percent of his
damages or $56,000 ($32,000 from B and $24,000 from C). B would recover
sixty percent of his damages or $60,000 ($30,000 from A and $30,000 from
B). C.would recover $42,000 ($18,000 from A and $24,000 from B). What
happens to the above recoveries after set-off? A ultimately recovers $8,000
consisting of $2,000 from B (the $32,000 that B owes A minus the $30,000
that A owes B) and of $6,000 from C (the $24,000 that C owes A minus the
$18,000 that A owes C). B ultimately recovers $6,000 from C (consisting of
the $30,000 that C owes B minus the $24,000 B owes C). C finally recovers
nothing.249
Although this appears to be an equitable as well as efficient procedure
244. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 19.2 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
245. Diehl v. Friester, 37 Ohio St. 473, 476-77 (1882). In this case the court noted that the
practice of setting off one judgment against another between the same parties is well-established and to
be used when it infringes on no other rights and protects the just rights of the parties. Judgments need
not be set off if they prejudice other rights. Id.
246. New Hampshire, Connecticut, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, Montana
and Pennsylvania. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 19.2 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
247. See Amended S. 165, 113th Gen. Assembly (1980), reprinted in OHIO LEGIS. SERV. LAWS OF
OHIO 5-59 (Baldwin 1980) [to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(1)].
248. This is presuming no joint and several liability complications.
249. This illustration is from H. Woods, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 17:4
(1978).
Part), Damages %Fault Amount Recovered Amount Received
A $ 80,000 30% $56,000 (-) $8,000 from B&C
B $100,000 40% $60,000 $6,000 from C
C $ 60,000 30% $42,000 -0-
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to determine individual parties' proportionate contributions, it becomes
windfall to the partys' liability insurers when they receive the benefit of the
set-off. This result, permitting insurers to pay less than full compensation
for damage caused by their insurees, has stimulated the enactment of
antiset-off provisions in the comparative fault statutes of both Rhode
Island and Oregon.2 50 For similar reasons the Supreme Court of Florida
held in Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Bournazian251 that "the concept of set-
off . . . applies only between uninsured parties to a negligence action, or
to insured parties to the extent that insurance does not cover their mutual
liabilities. 252 This pronouncement resulted from an automobile accident
litigation in which the plaintiff husband and wife recovered a $10,000
judgment and the defendant husband and wife were awarded $20,000 as a
result of their counter-claim. If the personal injury verdict for the plaintiffs
were to be set-off against the award for the defendants, the result, a net
judgment of $10,000 for the defendants, would be a windfall to the
defendants' insurer, who would pay nothing. The court rejected this
consequence as a defective view of insurance liability, declaring that "[t]he
effect of set-off as an antecedent to payment by each insurer is to abrogate
the parties' respective insurance contracts.
2 53
Since the Ohio statute merely permits rather than mandates set-offs
and since set-off is essentially an efficient procedure to be used only when it
does not trespass upon equity214 it is possible that the Ohio courts would
restrict its use to noninsured litigants or to insured parties to the extent that
insurance does not cover liability. While the use of set-offs when it
mutually cancels damages awarded to seriously injured parties and grants
a windfall to insurers may impair the general goal of fairness that is
anticipated in a comparative fault system and also may not comport with
the general tort policy of encouraging compensation for victims, the
elimination of set-offs for casualty insurance companies nevertheless has
some obvious earmarks of invidious discrimination.255
In sum, the Ohio statute and precedent permit the use of set-off in
single and multi-party actions in which there are counter-claims and in
which the parties claiming recovery have fault not greater than the total
fault of their opponents. The courts will need to examine the equities
carefully, however, when determining whether parties should be subject to
set-off when their insurers will be the ones to benefit.
XII. INDEMNITY
If the Act abolishes joint and several liability and the law of
250. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.490 (1979 Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9.20-4.1 (1956). See H. WOODS,
THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT § 17:5 (1978).
251. 342 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1977).
252. Id. at 474.
253. Id. at 473-74.
254. See note 245 supra.
255. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 19.3 (1974).
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contribution among joint tortfeasors, then the law of indemnity becomes
particularly important. In the successful indemnity action, the plaintiff-
indemnitee recovers from the defendant-indemnitor the entire loss he has
sustained and such a result has little to do with comparative fault.
Under common law, an implied contract of indemnity exists in the
following situations:
(1) [IW]here the one seeking indemnity has only a derivative or vicarious
liability for damage caused by the one sought to be charged.
(2) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability by action at the
direction, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be
charged.
(3) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability because of a
breach of duty owed to him by the one sought to be charged.
(4) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability merely because
of failure, even though negligent, to discover or prevent the misconduct
of the one sought to be charged.
(5) Where there is an express contract between the parties containing an
explicit undertaking to reimburse for liability of the character
involved. 6
A owns a restaurant. In the sidewalk in front of the restaurant there is
a trap door through which B delivers food products to the restaurant.
While delivering the products, B negligently leaves the trap door open,
causing a pedestrian-plaintiff to sustain serious injuries. Plaintiff sues A




Plaintiff sustains damages of $10,000. In light of the jury's apportionment
of fault, the court allows recovery of $9,000. Restaurant owner A pays
plaintiff $2,000 and seeks the amount from deliveryman B. B denies any
liability to A.
Upon these facts A will recover $2,000 from B. While there may be no
right of contribution, B does have a duty to indemnify A for any damages
suffered as a result of the incident. When a person is injured through the
violation of a duty owed in common by two persons and sues and recovers
from the one of the two who did not participate in the act or omission that
caused the injury, the nonparticipating person is only secondarily liable.
Upon payment of the judgment and expenses, he is entitled to indemnity
from the one whose act or omission was primary and gave rise to the
action. 7
In situations in which the indemnitee is not personally at fault-such
as when imputed or vicarious liability exists-there is no reason for the law
256. Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., - -Minn. -, ,255 N.W.2d 362,366 (1977),
quoting Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 372, 104 N.W.2d 843, 848
(1960).
257. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Frederick Co., 142 Ohio St. 605, 612-13, N.E.2d 795,798-99 (1944).
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of indemnity to be changed, and the indemnitee should recover the entire
loss from the indemnitor.
In cases in which the parties disputing indemnification are both at
fault, some courts are applying comparative negligence standards,
preferring to apportion fault rather than secure the harsh all or nothing
result of indemnification. For example, in Pachowitz v. Milwaukee &
Suburban Transport Corp.,258 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
the all or nothing approach of common law indemnity should be modified
in appropriate cases to permit a right of partial indemnity among multiple
tortfeasors when damages are apportioned on a comparative fault basis.
25 9
In this case, a woman sued a bus company after being let off a bus on a
defective curb. The bus company sought indemnification from the city for
maintaining the curb, but the court found it a proper case for apportioning
fault.260 In Southern Railway Co. v. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co.,261 the
court applied comparative negligence principles to a contractual
indemnity agreement between two negligent parties in which one promised
to indemnify the other for all damages resulting from his negligence. 62 The
court interpreted the agreement to entitle the indemnitee to recover only
that percentage of his damages not attributable to his own negligence.263 In
effect, the court applied not the rule of indemnity, but a form of
contribution based on degrees of relative fault.
CONCLUSION
This Article has been an attempt to discuss potential problems areas,
not to argue that comparative negligence is a troublesome concept or
necessarily a difficult one for lawyers and judges to apply. After all, juries
have been doing nicely with it for some time, without help from the bench
or bar.
Two suggestions are offered in conclusion. First, it would be well to
keep in mind that the purpose of the Ohio Comparative Negligence Act is
to ameliorate and modify the hitherto absolute defense of contributory
negligence in negligence actions, not to revamp or amend substantially the
tort law of the state. Keeping the statute in the context in which it was
enacted will do much to eliminate confusion and potential adventurism by
the more activist courts.
Second, to visualize how much difference the statute will make in
practice, review cases you have actually tried, not those you can imagine.
258. 56 Wis. 2d 383, 202 N.W.2d 268 (1972).
259. Id. at 386-87, 202 N.W.2d at 270.
260. Id. at 389-90, 202 N.W.2d at 272. See also Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis. 2d 371, 386, 204
N.W.2d 519, 527 (1973); City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641,657,207
N.W.2d 866, 871-72 (1973).
261. 376 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
262. Id. at 103.
263. Id.
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You will probably find that, with a few exceptions, little difference in
outcome would result from an application of the statute. Were this not the
case, we already would have heard the outcry from the thirty-plus
jurisdictions that now have some form of comparative negligence at work
in their courts.
The major difference for the practitioner probably will be the greater
number and variety of settlements that will result. No longer is evidence of
contributory negligence a signal to end negotiations and button up for
trial; it is just the beginning of the dialogue.

